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
Abstract. Emotions play a more and more important role in many fields of computer sciences such
as ambient intelligence, interaction human - machine, affective computing, etc. This paper firstly
constructs a logical framework to represent the qualitative cognitive factor of emotion based on a
logic of belief and a logic of time. Secondly, it constructs a hedge algebra and its extension with
fuzzy logic to represent the quantitative factor of emotions. These two aspects of emotion are then
combined to estimate the degree of emotions based on the degree of their cognitive factors.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Emotions play a more and more important role in many fields of computer sciences. The researches
aim at developing interaction systems that are closer and more attractive to their users, in particular
by endowing machines with the ability to predict, understand, and process emotions such as that
in the fields of ambient intelligence, interaction human - machine, affective computing, etc. There
are some motivations for reason why emotions become an active research area in computer science.
First, having emotional abilities enable agents more believable. Second, emotions have an impact on
cognition. Many psychologists proposed models of the impact of emotions on cognitions. Third, that is
because of the birth of affective computing (Picard [28]) whose objective is to construct a transparent
and adaptive interface between human and machine. This gives computers the human-like abilities of
observation, interpretation and generation of affect features, including user’s emotions. The ability of
interpretation seem to be at the core of emotional processing because it requires technologies which
enable computers to understand, represent and reason about emotions. Consequently, there are many
researches on emotions in computer sciences. These attempts could be regrouped into three mains
directions. First, there are many works on representing the concept of emotions as the work of Van
Dyke Parunak et al. [27], and Stephane [35]. Second, the works which try to formalize some emotions
such as the model of Meyer [20], Ochs et al. [24, 25], Adam et al. [1], and Bonnefon et al. [3, 4, 21].
Third, the works which try to calculate the degree of emotions such as that of Steunebrink et al.
[37, 36]. The work in this paper lies on the boundary of the second and the third direction: formalize
the concept and estimate the degree of emotion.
In order to construct an emotional model, computer scientists capitalize on psychological theories
of emotion. There are many theories of emotions in psychology (de Sousa [34]), such as feelings
theories which argue that emotions are feelings caused by changes in physiological conditions relating
to the autonomic and motor functions (James-Lange [18], Cannon-Bard [5], Schacter-Singer [32]);
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appraisal theories which consider emotion as a subjective evaluation of the environment in relation
to the agent’s goals (Arnold [2], Frijda [11], Lazarus [19], Roseman and Smith [31]), and cognitive
theories which say that emotions are characterized by their associated cognitions and therefore, can
be described as a set of beliefs, desires and feelings (Ortony et al. [26], Oakley [23], Reisenzein [30]),
etc. Most emotional applications for computers are built on the appraisal and cognitive theories of
emotions, which assume that emotions are closely tied to changes in beliefs and desires such as the
cognitive structure of emotion of Ortony et al. [26], the cognitive pattern of emotion of Lazarus
[19] and the belief-desire theory of emotion (BDTE) of Reisenzein [30]. The appraisal and cognitive
theories of emotions seem to be suitable to models constructed for interaction systems because: (i)
their position on the awareness of emotions enables agents to recognize their emotion as well as that
of their partners, and (ii) these theories assume that each emotion is characterized by its proper
cognitive structure, this feature enables the modeler to construct emotions by considering primitive
cognitive operators, such as belief and desire.
On the line with previous works [22], the combination of a formal logic for qualitative aspect and a
fuzzy logic for quantitative aspect is used in this paper. But this is not applied for trust/distrust, this
is applied for emotions. The model of emotion in this paper is also based on the cognitive structure
as proposed by Ortony et al. [26], Frijda [11] as well as those of Reisenzei [30] and Scherer et al. [33].
From these theories of emotions, The proposed model is constructed on two levels. At the qualitative
cognitive level, some emotions (cognitive aspect) is formalized in a formal logic based on the logic
of beliefs and choices as the one of Herzig and Longin [14] (a refinement from Cohen and Levesque
[9]), the logic of time (introduced by Arthur Prior [29]), and dynamic logic introduced by Fischer and
Ladner [10] and Harel et al. [13]. This part of work is closed to the work of Adam et al. [1], and
Bonnefon et al. [3, 4, 21]. At the quantitative level, the quantitative aspect of emotions is estimated
by using a hedge algebra to represent many different (and fuzzy) degree of emotions as well as that
of their cognitive factors. This hedge algebra is based on the hedge algebra of Nguyen and Wechler
[6, 17], and its extension with fuzzy logic (Nguyen et al. [15, 16]).
The model is then used to combine the qualitative and the quantitative aspects of some emotions.
Particularly, the degree of joy, distress, hope, fear, satisfaction, disappointment, fear-confirmed,
relief are estimated. There are some reasons that why only these eight emotions are selected to
model. First, they are well known and documented in the field of psychology. Most of them are
cognitively defined in the work of Ortony et al. [26], Frijda [11] as well as those of Reisenzei [30] and
Scherer et al. [33]. Second, there are many works in the field of computer science which also modeled
these emotions, such as the works of Adam et al. [1], Bonnefon et al. [3, 4, 21], and Steunebrink
et al. [37, 36]. Third, these eight emotions have the same (and simple) cognitive structure. They
concern only the individual felling about an event which just happens. So the same logic could be
used to model all of them. While other emotions (such as anger, gratitude...) have a more complex
cognitive structure. They concern not only the new event, but also the felling about an action of
other individual. So some other logic is needed to cover these complex emotions. This could be
perspective work in the near future.
This paper is organized as follows: Secsion 2. introduces the logical framework to represent
emotions based on their cognitive factors. Session 3. introduces the hedge algebra to represent
many degree of emotions and that of their cognitive factors. Session 4. combines the cognitive and
qualitative aspects of emotions. Session 5. compares and discusses about some closely related works.
Session 6. discusses about some limits of the model. The final session is a conclusion and future
works.
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2. LOGICAL FRAMEWORK
This section introduces a logical framework to cognitively represent emotions. This logic is mainly
based on the logic of Bonnefon et al. [3, 4, 21], the logic of beliefs and choices as the one of Herzig
and Longin [14] (a refinement from Cohen and Levesque [9]), the logic of time (introduced by Arthur
Prior [29]), and dynamic logic introduced by Fischer and Ladner [10] and Harel et al. [13].
2.1. Syntax
The syntactic primitives of the logic are as follows: a nonempty finite set of agents AGT =
{i1, i2, . . . , in}, a nonempty finite set of atomic events EV T = {e1, e2, . . . , ep}, and a nonempty set
of atomic propositions ATM = {p1, p2, . . .}. The language of the logic is defined by the following
BNF :
ϕ :=p | ¬ϕ | ϕ∨ϕ | Xϕ | X−1ϕ | Gϕ | Beliϕ | Choiceiϕ
where p ranges over ATM , The classical boolean connectives ∧ (conjunction),→ (material implica-
tion),↔ (material equivalence), > (tautology) and ⊥ (contradiction) are defined from ¬ (negation)
and ∨ (disjunction). Xϕ reads “ ϕ will be true next instant ”. X−1ϕ reads “ ϕ was true at the
previous instant ”. Gϕ reads “ henceforth, ϕ is true ”. Beliϕ reads “ agent i believes that ϕ is
true ”. Choiceiϕ reads “ agent i prefers that ϕ be true ”.
The following abbreviations are defined:
Fϕ
def
= ¬G¬ϕ,
Goaliϕ
def
= ChoiceiFBeliϕ,
Possiϕ
def
= ¬Beli¬ϕ.
Fϕ reads “ ϕ will be true in some future instants ”. Goaliϕ reads “ agent i has the goal (chosen
preference) that ϕ be true ”. Possiϕ reads “ agent i believes that it is possible ϕ ”.
2.2. Semantics and axiomatics
The logic for each operator is used as follows:
• A semantic based on linear time described by a sequence (or story) of time points is used for
temporal operators. (This semantics is very close to CTL* [8])
Xϕ↔¬X¬ϕ,
ϕ↔XX−1ϕ,
ϕ↔X−1Xϕ,
Gϕ↔ϕ∧XGϕ,
G(ϕ→ Xϕ)→(ϕ→ Gϕ).
• Beli and Choicei operators are defined in a normal modal logic plus (D) axioms (The same
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notation of modal logic axioms introduced by Chellas in [7].
Beliϕ↔BeliBeliϕ,
¬Beliϕ↔Beli¬Beliϕ,
Choiceiϕ↔BeliChoiceiϕ,
¬Choiceiϕ↔Beli¬Choiceiϕ.
3. HEDGE ALGEBRA
This section introduces a hedge algebra to represent the degree of emotions. This hedge algebra is
based on the hedge algebra theory of Nguyen and Wechler [6, 17] and its extension with fuzzy logic
[16, 15].
The hedge algebra is a set AX = {X,G,H,6}, where:
• X : the basic set of AX X = {0 (not at all), very low, low, little low, average, little high,
high, very high, 1 (absolute)}.
• G: the set of generators G = {low, average, high}.
• H : the set of linguistic hedges (also called unary operators, or hedge operations) h =
{very, little}.
• 6: is an ordered relation between any two elements of X : 0 6 very low 6 low 6 little low
6 average 6 little high 6 high 6 very high 6 1.
Figure 1. The fuzziness of linguistic hedges associated with emotions and their cognitive
factors
This algebra provide a set of hedges which could be associated with any concept of emotion. For
instance, with joy, there could have many variations of joy: not joy at all, very low joy, low joy,
little low joy, average joy, little high joy, high joy, very high joy, and absolute joy. These variations
have different degree. The degree of each depends on the fuzziness measure [16] of the linguistic
associated with it. This algebra intuitively defines the fuzziness of each element as indicated in Figure
1.
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In this model, the degree of a variation of an emotion (or its cognitive factors) is considered as
the fuzziness measure of the linguistic hedge associated with it
d(〈hedge〉〈object〉) =fm(〈hedge〉) (1)
where 〈hedge〉 ∈ AX is any linguistic hedge in the hedge algebra. 〈object〉 could be an emotion or
a cognitive factor of emotion. fm(x) is the fuzziness measure of the linguistic hedge x.
For instance, the degree of very low joy is the same as the fuzziness measure of the hedge very
low (d(very low joy) = fm(very low)), or the degree of very high joy is the same as the fuzziness
measure of the hedge very high (d(very high joy) = fm(very high)).
4. COMBINATION OF COGNITIVE AND QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS OF
EMOTIONS
This section presents the formalization of emotions, based on their cognitive structure as proposed
by Ortony et al. [26], Frijda [11] as well as those of Reisenzei [30] and Scherer et al. [33]. And then,
the degree of these emotions is estimated based on the combination of formal logic and fuzzy logic.
4.1. Joy/Distress
Joy is defined by two main factors [26]: (i) a proposition ϕ is desirable for agent i, and (ii) agent i
just experienced that ϕ is the case. The concept of Joy is accordingly represented as:
Joyiϕ =X
−1Goaliϕ ∧ Beliϕ.
While the second factor, Beliϕ, has only two possible values of true or false (or yes/no, 1/0 ),
the first factor, Goaliϕ, has many possible values corresponding to different degree of agent i’s desire
for ϕ: the more agent i desires for ϕ, the more agent i is happy when he is aware that ϕ is realized,
and vice versa. So the degree of Joyiϕ is estimated as:
d(Joyiϕ) =fspa(d(Goaliϕ), d(Beliϕ)), (2)
where fspa is a single-proportional-aggregation (SPA) mapping: fspa : [0, 1]
2 → [0, 1] which
satisfies the following conditions:
(1) fspa(x, 0) = 0,
(2) 0 ≤ fspa(x, 1) ≤ 1,
(3) fspa(x1, 1) ≤ fspa(x2, 1) if x1 ≤ x2.
For instance, when using fspa(x, y) = x ∗ y, the degree of joy depends on that of goal and believe
is indicated in Table 1.
The same analysis applies to Distress, it is defined by two main factors [26]: (i) A proposition
ϕ is undesirable for agent i, and (ii) agent i just experienced that ϕ is the case. The concept of
Distress is accordingly represented as:
Distressiϕ =X
−1Goali¬ϕ ∧ Beliϕ.
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And the degree of Distressiϕ is estimated as:
d(Distressiϕ) =fspa(d(Goali¬ϕ), d(Beliϕ))
=fspa(1− d(Goaliϕ), d(Beliϕ)) (3)
where fspa is a SPA mapping
1. Table 1 shows the variation of degree of Distressiϕ regarding the
degree of Goali¬ϕ and Beliϕ.
Table 1. Variations of joy and distress’ degree based on their contribution factors
Goaliϕ Goali¬ϕ Beliϕ Joyiϕ Distressiϕ
not at all absolute yes not at all absolute
very low very high yes very low very high
low high yes low high
little low little high yes little low little high
average average yes average average
little high little low yes little high little low
high low yes high low
very high very low yes very high very low
absolute not at all yes absolute not at all
4.2. Hope/Fear
Hope is defined by two factors [26]: (i) A proposition ϕ is desirable for agent i, and (ii) agent i
believes that ϕ may be true in the future. The concept of Hope is accordingly represented as:
Hopeiϕ =Goaliϕ ∧ PossiFϕ.
In this cognitive structure, both factors Goaliϕ and PossiFϕ could have many possible values
corresponding to different degree of agent i’s desire for ϕ, and the possibility of ϕ may be true
in some future instants. The more agent i desires for ϕ, the more agent i hopes that ϕ is realized,
and vice versa. The bigger the possibility of ϕ could be true in some future instant, the more agent
i hopes that ϕ is realized, and vice versa. So the degree of Hopeiϕ is estimated as:
d(Hopeiϕ) =fdpa(d(Goaliϕ), d(PossiFϕ)), (4)
where fdpa is a double-proportional-aggregation (DPA) mapping: fdpa : [0, 1]
2 → [0, 1] which
satisfies the following conditions:
(1) min(x, y) ≤ fdpa(x, y) ≤ max(x, y),
(2) fdpa(x1, y) ≤ fdpa(x2, y) if x1 ≤ x2,
(3) fdpa(x, y1) ≤ fdpa(x, y2) if y1 ≤ y2.
1It is easy to prove that the degree of Goaliϕ is inversely proportional to the degree of Goali¬ϕ, so in
this model, the degree of Goaliϕ is used as the complement of the degree of Goali¬ϕ in the interval [0, 1]:
d(Goaliϕ) = 1− d(Goali¬ϕ)
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For instance, when using fdpa(x, y) =
x + y
2
, the degree of hope depends on that of goal and
possible is indicated in Table 2.
The same analysis applies to Fear, it is defined by two factors [26]: (i) A proposition ϕ is
undesirable for agent i, and (ii) agent i believes that ϕ may be true in the future. The concept of
Fear is accordingly represented as:
Feariϕ
def
= Goali¬ϕ ∧ PossiFϕ.
And the degree of Feariϕ is estimated as:
d(Feariϕ) =fdpa(d(Goali¬ϕ), d(PossiFϕ)) (5)
where fdpa is a DPA. For instance, when using fdpa(x, y) =
x + y
2
, the degree of fear depends on
that of its cognitive factors is indicated in Table 3.
Table 2. Variations of hope’s degree based on its contribution factors
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The relationship between the degree of hope and that of fear about the same event is represented
in the Fig. 2. These results confirm one more time the fact that hope and fear are not always a bipolar
pair of emotion. So it could neither simply estimate their degree as: d(Hopeiϕ) = 1− d(Feari¬ϕ),
nor: d(Feariϕ) = 1− d(Hopei¬ϕ).
4.3. Satisfaction/Disappointment
Satisfaction is defined by three factors [26]: (i) Agent i desired a proposition ϕ; (ii) agent i used to
believe that ϕ might be true in the near future; and (iii) agent i now experiences that ϕ is really the
case. The concept of Satisfaction is accordingly represented as:
Satisfactioniϕ =X
−1(Goaliϕ ∧ PossiFϕ) ∧ Beliϕ.
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Table 3. Variations of fear’s degree based on its contribution factors
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Figure 2. Relationship between degree of hope and fear about the same event
The first two factors form the fact that i hoped for ϕ, so Satisfaction could be represented via Hope
as follows:
Satisfactioniϕ =X
−1Hopeiϕ ∧ Beliϕ.
As the factor of Beliϕ has only two statuses, the degree of satisfaction thus depends on the degree
of hope: the more ϕ was hoped for i, the more i is satisfied when ϕ is realized, and vise versa. And
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regarding the degree of hope, the degree of satisfaction is estimated as:
d(Satisfactioniϕ) =fspa(d(Hopeiϕ), d(Beliϕ))
=fspa(fdpa(d(Goaliϕ), d(PossiFϕ)), d(Beliϕ)) (6)
where fspa is a SPA, and fdpa is a DPA. For instance, when using fspa(x, y) = x ∗ y, the degree of
satisfaction is related to that of hope indicated in Table 4.
Table 4. Variations of satisfaction’s degree based on its contribution factors
Hopeiϕ Beliϕ Satisfactioniϕ
not at all yes not at all
very low yes very low
low yes low
little low yes little low
average yes average
little high yes little high
high yes high
very high yes very high
absolute yes absolute
The same analysis in the case of Disappointment, it is defined by three factors [26]: (i) Agent i
undesired a proposition ϕ; (ii) agent i used to believe that ¬ϕ might be true in the near future; and
(iii) agent i now experiences that ϕ is really the case. The concept of Disappointment is accordingly
represented as follows:
Disappointmentiϕ =X
−1(Goali¬ϕ ∧ PossiF¬ϕ) ∧ Beliϕ
=X−1Hopei¬ϕ ∧ Beliϕ
And the degree of disappointment as:
d(Disappointmentiϕ) =fspa(d(Hopei¬ϕ), d(Beliϕ))
=fspa(fdpa(d(Goali¬ϕ), d(PossiFϕ)), d(Beliϕ)) (7)
where fspa is a SPA, and fdpa is a DPA. For instance, when using fspa(x, y) = x ∗ y, the degree of
disappointment is related to that of hope (of not occur) indicated in Table 5.
4.4. Fear-confirmed/Relief
Fear-confirmed is defined by three factors [26]: (i) A proposition ϕ was undesirable for agent i; (ii)
agent i believed that ϕ might be true in the near future; and (iii) agent i now experiences that ϕ is
really true. The concept of Fear-confirmed is accordingly represented as:
FearConfirmediϕ =X
−1(Goali¬ϕ ∧ PossiFϕ) ∧ Beliϕ.
The first two factors form the fact that i ware scared for ¬ϕ, so Fear-confirmed could be represented
via Fear as follows:
FearConfirmediϕ =X
−1Feariϕ ∧ Beliϕ.
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Table 5. Variations of disappointment’s degree based on its contribution factors
Hopei¬ϕ Beliϕ Disappointmentiϕ
not at all yes not at all
very low yes very low
low yes low
little low yes little low
average yes average
little high yes little high
high yes high
very high yes very high
absolute yes absolute
Table 6. Variations of fear-confirmed’s degree based on its contribution factors
Feariϕ Beliϕ FearConfirmediϕ
not at all yes not at all
very low yes very low
low yes low
little low yes little low
average yes average
little high yes little high
high yes high
very high yes very high
absolute yes absolute
As the factor of Beliϕ has only two statuses, the degree of fear-confirmed thus depends on the
degree of fear : the more ϕ was scared for i, the more i is fear-confirmed when ϕ is realized, and vise
versa. And regarding the degree of fear, the degree of fear-confirmed is estimated as:
d(FearConfirmediϕ) =fspa(d(Feariϕ), d(Beliϕ))
=fspa(fdpa(d(Goali¬ϕ), d(PossiFϕ)), d(Beliϕ)) (8)
where fspa is a SPA, and fdpa is a DPA. For instance, when using fspa(x, y) = x ∗ y, the degree of
fear-confirmed is related to that of fear indicated in Table 6.
The same analysis for Relief, it is defined by three factors [26]: (i) A proposition ϕ was desirable
for agent i; (ii) agent i believed that ¬ϕ might be true in the near future; and (iii) agent i now
experiences that ϕ is really true. The concept of Relief is accordingly represented as:
Reliefϕ =X−1(Goaliϕ ∧ PossiF¬ϕ) ∧ Beliϕ
=X−1Feari¬ϕ ∧ Beliϕ.
And the degree of relief as:
d(Reliefϕ) =fspa(d(Feari¬ϕ), d(Beliϕ))
=fspa(fdpa(d(Goaliϕ), d(PossiF¬ϕ)), d(Beliϕ)) (9)
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where fspa is a SPA, and fdpa is a DPA. For instance, when using fspa(x, y) = x ∗ y, the degree of
relief is related to that of fear (of not occur) indicated in Table 7.
Table 7. Variations of relief’s degree based on its contribution factors
Feari¬ϕ Beliϕ Reliefϕ
not at all yes not at all
very low yes very low
low yes low
little low yes little low
average yes average
little high yes little high
high yes high
very high yes very high
absolute yes absolute
5. RELATED WORKS
This section compares and discusses about the some related works in the recent literature. Particu-
larly, the works of Adam et al. [1], Bonnefon et al. [3, 4] and Nguyen [21], Meyer [20], Ochs et al.
[24, 25], and Steunebrink et al. [36, 38].
The model of Adam et al. [1] is also based on the same foundation model of emotion as the
proposed model, the theory of Ortony et al. [26]. At the logical level, their formal framework is based
on the modal logic of belief, choice, time, and action of Herzig and Longin [14] which is a refinement
of Cohen and Levesque’s works [9] and the BDI modal logic of Georgeff et al. [12]. The difference is
on the semantic of time: in their logic, a story is a set of possible worlds plus some properties of the
corresponding accessibility relation that entails the linearity of time. While in the proposed logic,
a story is a primitive of the semantics. At the quantitative level, their model does not support to
estimate the degree of emotion.
The model of Bonnefon et al. [3, 4] and Nguyen [21] also based on the theory of Ortony et al. [26].
Their logic is also based on the modal logic of belief, choice, time, and action of Herzig and Longin
[14] which is a refinement of Cohen and Levesque’s works [9] and the BDI modal logic of Georgeff et
al. [12]. The difference is that their model considered only the qualitative aspect of emotion, but not
quantitative aspect: their model can not estimate the degree of emotion, except two bipolar values:
true or false. On the line with these works, the model in this paper bas been enriched with the ability
to estimate the degree of emotion by adding a hedge algebra and its extension with fuzzy logic to
model the quantitative aspect of emotion.
Meyer [20] presents a logic which enables to reason about the dynamics of emotional states of
agent. This logic is based on a BDI model [12], and the framework of dynamic logic and (an extension
of) the KARO framework [39]. Therefore, they focus on the action in their emotion’s definition
(original of dynamic logic). This is the main difference from us, but the principle is compatible.
Their model does not support to estimate the degree of emotion.
Ochs et al. [24, 25] also use the theory of Ortony et al. [26] as a foundation model. They also
based a logic of Belief and Desire to construct their emotional model. The main difference from the
proposed model in this paper is that they based on the capability of emotion’s owner. Their model
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does not support to estimate the degree of emotion.
Steunebrink et al. [36, 38] also use the theory of Ortony et al. [26] as a foundation model but they
formalize all twenty-two emotions of Ortony et al. as primitive operators in order to reason emotion
effects on action. Their model is thus far from the proposed model in this paper: each emotion is
presented as a primitive etiquette and therefore, there is no common component among emotions.
Their model does not support to estimate the degree of emotion.
6. DISCUSSION
This section discusses about the ability of applying emotion models as well as the proposed model
into some daily real life application, and some limits of the proposed model.
6.1. Applications of emotion models
As mentioned in the introduction section, there are three main reasons why emotions become an
active research area in computer science. This section presents some scenarios in which, the emotion
(and possibly the model) could be taken into account as one of the mains aspects of a daily real life
application.
6.1.1. Scenario 1: At a smart home
Pierre is a French living in a smart home in Paris. His favorite team of rugby is evidently France,
and his home also knows it. Today, there is the final match of The Rugby World Championship
between France and New Zealand. The match ends during the return of Pierre after a working day
at his office, and the winner is France. Pierre and his home are both conscious of this result. Pierre is
very happy until home. At the entrance door, the camera observes Pierre face and his home detects
that he is very happy. It argues that his happy could be from the event that France wins the final
match. Therefore, instead of saying a predictable and boring welcome phrase as “Welcome home
Pierre!”, via the speakers at the entrance, the smart home could say something more friendly as
“Congratulations for your team, Pierre! Viva La France!”.
In this scenario, there are some applications of emotion processing:
• The application of recognise the emotion from human face. This helps the smart home to
detect the happy of Pierre.
• The application of recognise and reasoning the emotion from it cognitive factor. This enables
the smart home to argue that the happy of Pierre could be from the event that France wins
the final match. This then leads the behaviour of the smart home more friendly and more
appropriated to the real emotional situation of the interaction.
6.1.2. Scenario 2: In a smart office
Today is the first day Ann goes to her smart office in New York after returning from a holiday vacation
in Maldive. There are three news waiting for her at the office. First, she will be promoted to a higher
position. Second, a partner rejected her proposal that she has bided before vacation. And third, a
client has already paid for the invoice that she has sent before vacation. The smart office plays the
role to tell Ann all news arrived during her vacation: these three news. It knows that the first news
could make Ann happy with a higher degree than the third one, and that the second news could
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brings her to a bad emotion. Therefore, the order of news that the smart office tells her is the first
news, the third news and then, the second one. This could reduce the degree of the bad emotion
when Ann receives the second news.
In this scenario, there are some applications of emotion processing:
• The application of recognise and reasoning the emotion from it cognitive factor. This enables
the smart office to estimate the degree of positive emotions to compare what is better for the
boss of the office.
• The application of reasoning about the effects of emotions on mood and behaviour, based on a
theory that: if there are two news: a good and a bad news. If we know the bad news after the
good one, the degree of the bad emotion could be lower than that comes when the bad news is
known before the good one. This helps the smart office to choose the good event, which brings
some positive emotions, to tell the boss of the office before telling the bad news.
• The application of estimating the degree of emotions. This helps the smart office to estimate
the degree of each emotion corresponding to some events, and then to detect which event could
bring the highest degree of positive emotion to tell before those could bring a lower degree
of positive emotion, and vice versa for the negative emotion. This leads the behaviour of the
smart office more efficient in order to increase the effects of positive emotions and to reduce
the effects of negative emotion in the real emotional situation of the interaction.
6.2. Limits of the model
The proposed model in this paper evidently has still some limits. First, that is problem of verifi-
cation/validation. In fact, the verification/validation of a logical framework is not an easy mission.
Many related logical frameworks (Adam et al. [1], Bonnefon et al. [3, 4] and Nguyen [21]) are not
validated yet, but they are popularly accepted, used and cited in the several fields of AI, psychology,
neurobiology... This is a limit of the model, and it is considered as a potential future work.
Second, this paper models only eight emotions which have a simple cognitive structure (reaction
for an event). many other emotions such as those in groups of composed emotion (c.f. Ortony et al.
[26]) are not still modelled. Their cognitive structure is more complex. So some other logic is needed
to cover these complex emotions. This could be one of perspective works in the near future.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper firstly introduces a logical framework for the representation of emotion based on a logic
of belief and a logic of time. Secondly, it introduces a hedge algebra and its extension with fuzzy
logic to represent the degree of emotions and that of their cognitive factors. These two aspects of
emotion are then combined to estimate the degree of emotions based on the degree of their cognitive
factors. The paper estimates nine different degrees (not at all, very low, low, little low, average,
little high, high, very high, absolute) of eight emotions (joy, distress, hope, fear, satisfaction,
disappointment, fear-confirmed, relief ) based on the degree of their cognitive factors.
Although this logic is enough to formalize and estimate the degree of these eight emotions, it
is not enough to represent and estimate the degree of other complex emotion such as compound
emotions. These current limitations are also the potential perspective for future research.
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